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Law and Technology: Interactions and
Relationships
Daniel J. Gifford*
The relations between law and technology are both simple
and exceedingly complex.
At the most elementary level,
technology consists in the application of labor to create a
product, to generate a service or otherwise to produce a desired
result. Technology develops as ways are found to produce new
results or to produce old results using fewer or less costly
inputs. Law is generally understood to exist as a set of rules
adopted by a society's governing institutions that are applicable
to all of its inhabitants.' All modern societies have established
institutions charged with making determinations about the
applicability and interpretations of these rules. They have also
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1. See H.L.A. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW 89-96 (1961). Hart divides
rules into "primary rules of obligation" and secondary rules. Primary rules are
those that govern behavior and facilitate contracting and other fulfilling
activities. Secondary rules are concerned with interpreting, applying, and
enforcing primary rules.
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established institutions that enforce the rules. Law and
technology interact when legal rules foster or retard the
development of technology. They also interact when society
decides that technology produces undesirable results and
employs legal rules to contain or modify those results.
I. BACKGROUND
It is generally understood that property rights are
essential to generating incentives to productive behavior.
Because traditional property does not include intellectual
creations-such as the design of new technology-society has
expanded that regime to include limited forms of protection for
intellectually creative acts.
Let's briefly review this
background.
A. THE LAW, PROPERTY RIGHTS, INCENTIVES, AND TRADE

In defining property rights, the law creates the conditions
that are crucial for the development of technology. Without
property rights, the world would be a vast commons in which
productive incentives would be absent. Few would labor to
create wealth if others were free to take it. Property rights
enable people to keep the wealth that they create. Property
rights, for example, enable the farmer to keep the crops that he
raises. These rights provide him with the incentive to farm.
Almost all societies have recognized such basic property rights
as the right of a farmer to his crops. But a new and crucial
dimension is added to property rights when property becomes
transferable.
When property is transferable, then the incentives to be
productive increase exponentially. When a farmer possesses
the right to keep the crops that he raises, he has an incentive to
raise crops to feed himself and his family. When he is able to
trade his crops for goods or services provided by others, he
acquires an incentive to produce more than for his own needs.
Transferability means that I have an incentive not only to
create goods and services for myself. It means that I have an
incentive to create goods and services for others as well, since I
will be able to transfer the benefit of my productive activity to
others, and they will be able to compensate me by transferring
some of their property to me in payment. As discussed below,
transferability provides the basis for specialization and scale
economies, and it also underlies the principle of comparative
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advantage in international trade.
B.

INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND ITS INCENTIVES

Although property rights are essential to productive
incentives, traditional property rights fail to generate
incentives for creative activities. If I devise a new product or a
new, more efficient way to employ inputs to produce wealth, my
creativity can be replicated at will in a society that recognizes
rights only in traditional property. Modern societies, therefore,
create rights in intellectual creations in order to provide
incentives to create as yet unknown technologies or
improvements in existing technology. A person who creates a
new technology qualifying for patent protection, for example,
acquires exclusive rights in his invention for a twenty year
period. 2 The laws creating these rights are generally referred
to as intellectual property laws. A common way of viewing
these laws is to see them as remedying a market failure by
filling a pre-existing gap in property protection. 3 Just as
tangible property rights transform what would otherwise be an
incentive-free commons into a regime that provides productive
incentives, intellectual property laws transform parts of a
preexisting intellectual commons into a regime that provides
incentives for creativity. The intellectual property laws that
are most important to the development of technology are the
patent and copyright laws.
Their importance has been
recognized throughout the history of the Republic. Indeed, the
U.S. Constitution specifically authorizes Congress to enact both
sets of laws in order "[t]o promote the Progress of Science and
useful Arts."4 This phrasing reflects the understanding of the
Framers that creative activities could be stimulated through
the economic incentives that the patent and copyright laws
provide.
II. COMPETITION, MONOPOLY, TECHNOLOGY AND THE
GENERATION OF WEALTH
We know that free and open markets maximize productive
incentives and that competition among sellers maximizes

2. 35 U.S.C. § 154(a)(2) (2000).
3. See, e.g., Daniel J. Gifford, Innovation and Creativity in the Fine Arts:
The Relevance and Irrelevance of Copyright, 18 CARDOzO ARTS & ENT. L.J.
569, 572-73 (2000).
4. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
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societal wealth.5 So long as markets operate competitively,
goods and services are routed to their highest valued uses. A
competitive economic system also fosters productive efficiency
in the short run by pressuring producers to employ their most
cost-effective techniques and in the long run by replacing the
less efficient producers with more efficient producers. Thus, at
all times, competition pressures producers to employ the most
efficient technologies available to them.
Although competitive markets force producers to act
efficiently, the tendencies of monopolies are otherwise.
Monopolies tend to restrict production in order to maintain
prices at higher-than-competitive levels. In so doing, they deny
society those uses of their products whose values are less than
the monopoly price but higher than their cost of production.
This output restriction is inconsistent with the allocation of
society's assets to their highest valued uses and constitutes a
social waste that economists often refer to as a "deadweight
social loss." 6

In this respect, monopolies produce allocative

inefficiencies. Monopolies, moreover, are also less keyed to
productive efficiency, as the incentives to implement new
technologies are reduced in monopolistic market structures.
While competitive markets are forced by competition to adopt
the most efficient technologies as they emerge, monopolies lack
that competitive pressure. A monopolist, of course, has an
incentive to invest in efficient technology, as that technology
will reduce its costs and thereby increase its profits. But
because the incentive structure is reduced, the implementation
7
of new technology may be delayed
Society's embrace of competitive markets as a means of
maximizing aggregate wealth exists in a dynamic tension with
the use of the exclusive rights over technological developments

5. See Daniel J. Gifford, Government Policy Towards Innovation in the
United States, Canada, and the European Union as Manifested in Patent,
Copyright, and Competition Laws, 57 SMU L. REV. 1339, 1340 (2004).
6.

See,

e.g.,

ROBERT

S.

PINDYCK

&

DANIEL

L.

RUBINFELD,

MICROECONOMICS 348 (5th ed. 2001). The deadweight social loss is the net
value of the output that would be produced in a competitive market, but which
is not produced by a monopoly. It is the difference between (1) potential
buyers' reservation prices that are less than the monopoly price and (2)
marginal cost.
7. See Kenneth Arrow, Economic Welfare and the Allocation of Resources
for Invention, in THE RATE AND DIRECTION OF INVENTIVE ACTIVITY (R.R.
Nelson ed., 1969).
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provided by the intellectual property laws. Because there may
be no effective substitutes for some such developments, the
exclusive rights provided under the patent law may amount to
an economic monopoly. In exercising its monopoly power under
the patent, the patentee may, like other monopolists, license
the technology at rates that are sufficiently high as to exclude
many uses. As a result, society is denied uses of a valuable
technology, societal assets are misallocated, and deadweight
social loss results.8
The tension between intellectual property rights and
competition is reflected in the uneasy relationship that has
existed, and continues to exist, between the antitrust laws and
the intellectual property laws, especially within patent and
copyright law. In one view, perceived conflict between the
policies of the Sherman Act and patent and copyright laws
lacks substance. The competition laws are designed to foster
economic welfare and so are the intellectual property laws. The
latter employ exclusive rights as a means for generating new
technology; and new technology raises societal welfare. The
restraints imposed by intellectual property rights holders are in
newly created markets that would not have existed had these
restraints been barred ex ante. In this view, the intellectual
property laws do not create restraints that would not exist in
their absence.
Finally, technology probably is largely
responsible for much of our economic welfare, and the
intellectual property laws are designed to foster the
development of new technology.9
There
are, however, more sophisticated ways of
understanding the relation between the competition laws and
the intellectual property laws. It is true that intellectual
property laws help to provide the incentives that stimulate the
technological innovation that enriches society.
But that
analysis is overly simple. Intellectual property laws generate
both benefits and costs. Their major costs lie in the very
exclusivity that they provide rights holders. Those laws not

8. See Daniel J. Gifford, How Do the Social Benefits and Costs of the
Patent System Stack Up in Pharmaceuticals?,12 J. INTELL. PROP. L. 75, 82
(2004).
9. See, e.g., Joseph F. Brodley, The Economic Goals of Antitrust:
Efficiency, Consumer Welfare, and Technological Progress, 62 N.Y.U. L. REV.
1020, 1026 (1987) ("[S]tudies have shown that over the forty-year period from
the late 1920s to the late 1960s, at least half of the gain in United States
output was due solely to technological and scientific progress.")
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only generate new technology, they also restrict its use. This
restriction-however justified as necessary to generate
incentives-is nonetheless a social waste. Ideally, a society
should limit intellectual property rights to a term in which the
marginal social costs of the restraints that they facilitate are
less than the marginal social benefits that they provide. Louis
Kaplow developed such an analysis over twenty years ago.10
Observing that the longer the patent term, the greater the
incentive to invent, Kaplow assumed that lengthening the
patent term would generate additional inventions. But he also
pointed out that an increase in the patent term would extend
the patent-based restraints on all existing patents-patents on
inventions for which the existing term of protection was
adequate. Extending the term would both generate marginal
social benefits (i.e., new inventions) and marginal social costs
(i.e., adding an additional year of restrictions on all other
inventions). Although Kaplow's analysis is ingenious, it cannot
be easily applied because no one knows how to quantify either
the marginal benefits or the marginal costs of inventions. His
analysis does, however, provide a conceptual insight into the
policy issues latent in tensions between competition laws and
intellectual property laws.
Moreover, Kaplow's analysis
provides a framework for policy judgments. Under simplified
but reasonable assumptions, the existing patent term may well
produce positive welfare results at the margins.11
III. THE SCOPE OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY
PROTECTION
The law defines not only the term of intellectual property
rights but also their scope. In defining their scope, the law
again enters an area of tension. For decades, the competition
laws and the intellectual property laws have wrestled with
issues of tying and bundling, which are issues that concern the
scope of intellectual-property protection. Does my intellectual
property right authorize me to insist that purchasers, lessees or
licensees use other products along with the protected one? In
the early twentieth century, the courts appeared willing to
permit a patentee to control the products that could be used

10. See Louis Kaplow, The Patent-Antitrust Intersection: A Reappraisal,
97 HARV. L. REV. 1813, 1825-26 (1984).
11.

See Gifford, supra note 8, at 106.
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with a patented one. 12 Later, the courts developed a doctrine of
patent misuse as part of patent law. 13 During the first half of
the last century, the courts treated the tying of a separate
product to a patented one as misuse. 14 During the period of
misuse, the courts would not enforce the patent. The misuse
cases eventually affected the antitrust laws. 15 In the 1960s, the
act of tying a product to a patent or copyright became a per se
16
antitrust violation.
The tensions between these two sets of laws, however, were
a source of continuing readjustment. In the 1952 patent act
revision, Congress drew limits on the judicially-developed
doctrine of patent misuse.17
Henceforth, misuse would be
limited to the tying involving so-called staple articles of
commerce. Products designed specially for use with a patented
product could be tied with impunity to a patented product.1 8
Congress strengthened its restrictions on the misuse doctrine
in 1988.19 Even as Congress was narrowing the doctrine of
patent misuse at mid-century, the courts were expanding the
application of the antitrust laws to tying arrangements
involving patents. From the late 1940s well into the 1970s, the
courts presumed that a patent created market power, and from
that presumption created a virtually per se rule against tying
arrangements involving patents. 20 Although in the 1970s the

12. See, e.g., Henry v. A.B. Dick Co., 224 U.S. 1, 47-49 (1912); HeatonPeninsular Button-Fastener Co. v. Eureka Specialty Co., 77 F. 288, 300-01
(6th Cir. 1896).
13. See Mercoid Corp. v. Mid-Continent Inv. Co., 320 U.S. 661, 665-68
(1944); Mercoid Corp. v. Minneapolis-Honeywell Regulator Co., 320 U.S. 680,
680 (1944); Morton Salt Co. v. G.S. Suppiger Co., 314 U.S. 488, 489 (1942);
Carbice Corp. ofAm. v. Am. Patents Dev. Corp., 283 U.S. 27, 33-34 (1931). The
origins of the misuse doctrine are traceable to Motion Picture Patents Co. v.
Universal Film Mfg. Co., 243 U.S. 502 (1917).
14. See cases cited supra note 13.
15. Minneapolis-Honeywell Regulator Co., 320 U.S. at 684 ("[T]he effort
made here to control competition in this unpatented device plainly violates the
anti-trust laws").
16. United States v. Loew's Inc., 371 U.S. 38, 44-45 (1962).
17. 35 U.S.C. § 271 (2000).
18. See 35 U.S.C. § 271 (2000).
19. See Pub. L. 100-703, § 201, 102 Stat. 4676 (codified as amended at 35
U.S.C. § 271 (2000)).
20. See Times-Picayune Pub. Co. v. United States, 345 U.S. 594, 608
(1953); Int'l Salt Co. v. United States, 332 U.S. 392, 398-402 (1947); Mercoid
Corp. v. Mid-Continent Inv. Co., 320 U.S. 661 (1944). See also Daniel J.
Gifford, The Antitrust/IntellectualPropertyInterface: An Emerging Solution to
an IntractableProblem, 31 HOFSTRA L. REV. 363, 380-81 (2002).
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courts began retreating from their earlier view that tying
arrangements were always socially harmful, 21 it was not until
2006 that the Supreme Court explicitly ruled that a patent
would not be presumed to generate market power for purposes
22
of applying the antitrust laws to tying arrangements.
Other issues of patent scope have plagued patent law for
decades. Patent law is designed to extend protection only to
inventions that are advances beyond the capability of ordinary
practitioners in the field.2 3 And the law protects only what the
inventor claims. Yet within these simple rules, troublesome
issues constantly emerge. The judicially-developed doctrine of
equivalents is designed to extend protection to matter not
covered in the claims but which are insubstantial variations of
the claimed invention.2 4 Thus at mid-century the Court
extended the scope of a patented welding flux from the
combination set forth in the claims (a composition of calcium
fluoride with an alkaline earth-metal silicate) to a different
combination with the same properties (a combination of
25
calcium fluoride with manganese (a non-earth metal silicate).
In recent years, the courts have sharply curtailed the
availability of the doctrine of equivalents. Amendments to a
patent application are likely to estop a patentee from later
relying upon the doctrine of equivalents, especially when the
patentee attempts to use that doctrine against variations that
were foreseeable at the time of the amendment.2 6 In the bio27
tech area, the patent law's written description requirement
limits the doctrine of equivalents in ways that make its
ramifications socially problematic. Thus in a leading case, the
Federal Circuit ruled that the University of California at
Berkeley, which had isolated the DNA coding for rat insulin,

21.
22.

U.S. Steel Corp. v. Fortner Enterprises, Inc., 429 U.S. 610 (1977).
Illinois Tool Works Inc. v. Independent Ink, Inc., 126 S.Ct. 1281, 1293

(2006).
23. 35 U.S.C. § 103 (2000).
24. See Festo Corp. v. Shoketsu Kinzoku Kogyo Kabushiki Co., 535 U.S.
722, 731 (2002) (referring to the doctrine of equivalents extending to
"[u]nimportant and insubstantial substitutes for certain elements" of the
patent claims).
25. Graver Tank & Mfg. Co. v. Linde Air Prods., Inc., 339 U.S. 605, 611-12

(1950).
26. Festo Corp., 535 U.S. at 736-40; Warner-Jenkinson Co., Inc., v. Hilton
Davis Chemical Co., 520 U.S. 17, 40-41 (1997).
27. See 35 U.S.C. § 112 (2000).
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could not assert claims to human insulin, even though human
and rat insulin are very similar.2 8 Despite this similarity, the
university's claim for human insulin failed because it had
described only the DNA sequence for rat insulin.
That
description, however, may well have been sufficient to enable
others to produce human insulin (by employing the identified
sequence to construct a gene probe that would identify the
29
human variant).
The doctrinal issues discussed above are part of a larger
policy conundrum involving questions of how the law should be
structured to generate optimum incentives for inventive
activity. Is the description requirement being applied in such a
stringent manner as to destroy the incentive to invent? A
patent on rat insulin loses its commercial value if others can
employ that patent as a tool to produce human insulin. The
current stringency with which the doctrine of equivalents is
interpreted may effectively destroy the commercial benefits of
many inventions and thus undermine the very incentives that
the law is designed to foster. Professors Dan Burk and Mark
Lemley have argued that both the scope of patent protection
and the height of the bar posed by the requirement of nonobviousness should vary by field of invention.3 0 In the bio-tech
arena, for example, patents should be difficult to acquire, but,
once acquired, should provide extensive protection over a wide
area, which is a result that is at odds with the current case law.
The Lemley and Burk approach would help mitigate the
problem of the anti-commons that some have suggested may be
31
adversely affecting research and innovation in bio-technology.
The argument is that multiple patents on minor inventions are

28. Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Eli Lilly & Co., 119 F.3d 1559, 1559
(Fed. Cir. 1997).
29. The Eli Lilly court itself acknowledged that the specification may have
provided an enabling disclosure. See Eli Lilly, 119 F.3d at 1567. See also
Carrie A. Morgan, After the Fire and Rain, Lilly Still Stands, 31 DAYTON L.
REV. 127, 139 (2005); Michael Delmas Plimier, Genentech, Inc. v. Novo
Nordisk & University of California v. Eli Lilly and Co., 13 BERKELEY TECH.
L.J. 149, 160 (1998).
30. See Dan L. Burk & Mark A. Lemley, Policy Levers in Patent Law, 89
VA. L. REV. 1575, 1680-83 (2003).
31. Michael A. Heller & Rebecca S. Eisenberg, Can Patents Deter
Innovation? The Anticommons in Biomedical Research, 280 SCI. 698, 698-701
(1998). See also Michael A. Heller, The Tragedy of the Anticommons: Property
in the Transition from Marx to Markets, 111 HARv. L. REV. 621, 624-25 (1998).
But see David E. Adelman, A Fallacy of the Commons in Biotech Patent
Policy, 20 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 985 (2005).
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crowding the available research space, so that potential
inventors are discouraged by the need to obtain multiple
licenses, thus raising the costs of inventive activity. Raising
the standard of non-obviousness in the bio-tech area as they
suggest would generate fewer patents, thus freeing up research
space for the development of more valuable inventions.
IV. NEGATIVE EXTERNALITIES
The negative aspects of the law and technology
relationship are illustrated in a leading New York case that
applied (and modified) classic nuisance doctrine against a
cement plant whose emissions of dust and raw materials were
damaging nearby landowners. 32 Although the court ostensibly
refused to make use of private litigation as a means of
furthering the public interest in cleaner air by closing the
offending plant, the court nonetheless recognized that cost
externalities underlay the lawsuit. In its ruling, the court
ordered the defendant to compensate the plaintiffs, thus forcing
the defendant to internalize the pollution costs that theretofore
had been borne by the plaintiffs. The problem in this case-as
in almost all pollution cases-is that the adverse effects of a
business firm's discharges into the air or water do not appear
on the firm's books as a cost of its operations nor does the firm
bear those costs in any other way. 33 Accordingly, costs that are
properly attributable to the firm's operations are borne by
others or by society at large. Federal and state anti-pollution
legislation is thus directed towards forcing business firms to
internalize these costs. Firms internalize these costs when
they compensate affected people (as in the New York case cited
above) or when they take action to reduce the levels of the
emissions from their plants. When all such firms take such
action, they pass on those costs to their customers, who bear
32. See Boomer v. Atlantic Cement Co., 26 N.Y.2d 219, 219-20 (1970). The
application of traditional nuisance doctrine would have required the court to
abate the nuisance by shutting down the defendant's plant. Because the value
of the defendant's operations greatly exceeded the harm imposed on the
plaintiffs, the court instead ordered the defendant to compensate the plaintiffs
for their harm. The court thus forced the defendant to internalize as costs
that part of its operations that were imposing harm upon the plaintiffs. See
discussion of this case in Alexandra B. Klass, Common Law and Federalism in
the Age of the Regulatory State, 92 IOwA L. REV. 545, 571-72 (2007).
33. See discussion of externalities in PINDYCK & RUBINFELD, supra note 6,
at 621.
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34
the final costs of producing the products that they desire.
The task of forcing polluting business firms to internalize
their costs was initially carried out through traditional
prescriptive regulation. 35 In recent years, however, legislators
and policy-makers have concluded that the traditional
command-and-control approach to pollution reduction is often
not the most effective one. As a result, an array of programs
involving incentives, pollution caps, trading permits, and
stakeholder negotiations have emerged. 36 Experience appears
to show that the basic idea behind these less coercive
approaches is a sound one, but that the programs need to be
37
carefully designed and supervised to prevent abuses.

V. POSITIVE EXTERNALITIES
To what extent can law be designed to engender enhanced
economic growth by, for example, fostering synergisticallyemployed technologies, the creation of compact skilled labor
markets, or the development of advanced technology? Both
theory and experience suggest that laws and legal institutions
can play significant, but limited, roles in technological
development. Law and legal institutions play a significant role
in the development of new technology through the intellectualproperty laws, as noted above.38 The law and legal institutions
play a major role in engendering basic research, for which
market incentives are lacking. 39 These legal and governmental
interventions are general in nature and help to provide

34. See, e.g., Thomas Lundmark, Systemizing Environmental Law on a
German Model, 7 DICK. J. ENVTL. L & POL'Y, 1, 18 (1998) (discussing
internalization of social costs of pollution and their transmission to
customers).
35. See, e.g., J.B. Ruhl, Regulation by Adaptive Management-Is it
Possible? 7 MINN. J. L. SCI. & TECH. 21 (2005).
36. See, e.g., Mark Seidenfeld, Empowering Stakeholders: Limits on
Collaborationas the Basis for Flexible Regulation, 41 WM & MARY L. REV. 411,
411-14 (2000); Jeffrey M. Hirsch, Emissions Allowance Trading Under the
Clean Air Act: A Model for Future Environmental Regulations?, 7 N.Y.U.
ENVTL. L.J. 352 (1999) (discussing permit trading and caps).
37. Christopher H. Schroeder, Prophets, Priests, and Pragmatists, 87
MINN. L. REV. 1065, 1091 (2003) (discussing, inter alia, successes of cap-andtrade program under the Clean Air Act and the failures of cap-and-trade
under analogous California laws).
38. See supra text accompanying notes 2-4, 9-10.
39. Most basic research is funded by the federal government. See U.S.
CENSUS BUREAU, STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE UNITED STATES: 2001 508

tbl. 769 (2001).
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stimulus that the market cannot provide.
Law can be effective in promoting economic objectives
when it acts as an adjunct to the market. The genius of the
patent system is that it provides a legal structure keyed to the
market. 40 The law provides the exclusive rights that act (in
conjunction with the market) as the stimulus to invention, but
the market is the ultimate determinant of the rewards. The
system rewards only those who produce what the market
demands.
Should government-through law and legal
institutions-attempt intervention to foster the growth of
particular industrial sectors or business firms, it is likely to
fail. An array of proposals for government intervention in
particular sectors of the economy were made during the 1980s
and early 1990s under the rubric of "industrial policy". 41 In
these situations, the success of government and legal
intervention would require legislators or officials to possess
greater information than the market. Because this is virtually
impossible, government interventions on behalf of particular
industries or companies are almost certain to decrease rather
than increase overall economic well-being. In addition to the
government's relative lack of knowledge, its attempts at
intervention in the economy would be subject to distortion by
interest groups seeking assistance, often from the very
industries that were in decline and whose future was in
doubt. 42 Yet it would be those industries-because of their

40. See Gifford, supra note 8, at 83-84.
41. See, e.g., CONGRESSIONAL BUDGET OFFICE, THE INDUSTRIAL POLICY
DEBATE
xiii-xxii
(1983),
available
at
http://www.cbo.gov/showdoc.cfm?index=5320&sequence0;
Industrial Policy
Symposium, 5 STAN. L & POL'Y REV. 6 (1993). One commentator described an
array of such proposals in the early 1990's as follows:
[J]oint research and development with the federal government or
with federal government support; permitting joint activities that
otherwise would be prohibited by antitrust laws; and foreign
marketing support. For example, subsidized financing, through the
export import bank or other means, and reductions in the costs of
operating a business through tax benefits. Things of this sort are all
in the category of industrial policy that is being considered at the
moment.

Robert C. Cassidy, Jr., Trade Policy Aspects of IndustrialPolicy in the U.S., 19
CAN-U.S. L.J. 55 (1993). The governmental structures that would facilitate
such industrial policies are described in Robert E. Scott, Sectorial Policies and

ParticipantCommitments: The Keys to Effective Trade and IndustrialPolicies,
5 STAN. L & POL'Y REV. 127 (1993).
42. See, e.g., Jim Chen & Daniel J. Gifford, Law as Industrial Policy:
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close community ties and sometimes large work forces-that
would be able to exert substantial political pressure on their
behalf. For all of these reasons, government, law, and legal
institutions
appear
incapable
of generating
positive
externalities in particular sectors of the economy.
VI. INTERNATIONAL TRADE AND TECHNOLOGY
A key spur to industrial development in the United States
has been its large continent-wide market. This large market
has enabled manufacturers to employ technology incorporating
scale economies.
Conversely, during the late nineteenth
century and early twentieth century, Europe was divided into
nation-sized markets by protectionist legislation4 3 As a result,
European manufacturers lacked access to a large market that
was conducive to scale economies. Although a tariff barrier
also protected U.S. markets during this period, its
manufacturers nonetheless had access to the large U.S.
domestic market.
The negative effects of protection on
industrial development that afflicted European manufacturers,
44
accordingly, were muted in this country.
Since the adoption of the General Agreement on Tariffs
and Trade4 5 after the conclusion of World War II, the nations of
the world have been gradually reducing their tariffs,
stimulating an ever increasing amount of international trade.
This movement towards freer trade culminated in the creation
of the World Trade Organization in 1994 and the associated
TRIPS agreement. 46 The lowering of tariffs and other barriers
to trade subjects U.S. industries to competition from abroad
(and subjects foreign producers to competition from U.S.
producers), thus intensifying worldwide competition. This new
competition increases the pressures on all industry participants
to develop and employ the most efficient technologies. This
Economic Analysis of Law in a New Key, 25 U. MEM. L. REV. 1315, 1346-47
(1995).
43. See Daniel J. Gifford, Trade and Tensions, 15 MINN. J. INT'L L. 297,
298-99 (2006).
44. See. e.g., discussion in Daniel J. Gifford, Trade and Tensions, 15
MINN. J. INT'L. L. 297, 299-300 (2006).
45. General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, Oct. 30, 1947, 61 Stat. A3,
T.I.A.S. No. 1700, 55 U.N.T.S. 187.
46. See AGREEMENT ON TRADE-RELATED ASPECTS OF INTELLECTUAL
PROPERTY RIGHTS, Annex 1C, April 15, 1994, 1869 U.N.T.S. 299, 33 I.L.M.
1197
(1994)
[hereinafter
TRIPS
Agreement],
available
at

http://www.wto.org/english/docs-e/legal-e/27-trips.pdf.
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intensifying global competition provides a comparative
advantage to labor-intensive technologies in developing nations
with relatively low wage rates.
As a result, U.S.-based
producers in labor-intensive industries producing tradable
goods are in the process of being replaced by producers from
developing nations. At the same time, the adoption of the
TRIPS agreement means that the U.S. advantages in the
production of creative products (such as in the software,
pharmaceuticals, and entertainment industries) will be
strengthened, as intellectual property protection extends
globally.
The pressures of global competition thus are forcing a
reallocation of the technologies employed in each nation in
ways that reflect each nation's comparative advantage.
Although some temporary hardships will occur, the end result
will produce an overall increase in the world's wealth,
benefiting all nations. And because the new WTO-TRIPS
regime widens protection of intellectual property, the
incentives for innovation are increased. These increased
incentives should generate additional innovation, which over
time will produce increases in global welfare.
VII. LEGAL FAILURES AND MARKET FAILURES
The preceding discussion has referenced various places in
which laws and market incentives interact to foster the
development and employment of technology, generating
increases in aggregate welfare. Yet there remain gaps or
failures in these law/market interactions. Market failures are
often the result of the failures of the legal system to adequately
specify property rights. Intellectual property laws, for example,
are required to remedy inadequacies in the property rights
47
regime that the legal system developed in simpler times.
Thus, market failures can often be understood as the result of
legal failures. In the twenty-first century, other failures of the
law/market relationship are becoming widely appreciated.
These newly appreciated failures differ from the law/market
failures previously discussed because they are not identified by
welfare analyses that use an index of maximizing aggregate
economic welfare for measurement.
The pharmaceutical industry provides an example of how
47.

See supra text accompanying notes 2-4.
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law and technology interact both positively and negatively.
The current intellectual property system generates incentives
for pharmaceutical companies to develop new drugs for the
relief of illnesses experienced by the populations of the
developed nations. As observed above, the companies are
rewarded for their efforts from sales of successful products at
supra-competitive prices. It was noted above that a negative
(albeit necessary) effect of this system is the short-term waste
that results when these higher prices exceed the reservation
prices of potential customers. 48
TRIPs requires that all
members of the WTO begin to recognize and enforce
intellectual property rights. 49 Most of these rights involving
pharmaceuticals belong to companies from the developed world.
As a result, the negative effects of intellectual property rights
involving pharmaceuticals are magnified. The legal framework
established by the WTO and TRIPs have only gradually began
50
to adjust to these problems.
First, the short-term waste imposed by the denial of lifesaving drugs to millions in the under-developed world is
immense, dwarfing the dead-weight loss in the developed
nations. In the under-developed nations, the lives of millions of
people depend upon access to HIV-AIDS drugs. If they cannot
receive these drugs because the prices are keyed to the markets
of the developed world, then the social loss is staggering.
Moreover, in assessing this loss, traditional economic
approaches are problematic: it will not do to set the value of a
life on the basis of a person's earnings converted into the
currency of the developed world, as in euros or dollars. Such an
approach would obscure the human tragedy involved. Second,
the current international legal system appears to impede any
effort by the pharmaceutical companies to reduce their prices
in the poorer underdeveloped world. Those companies might
benefit themselves as well as millions of potential customers by
offering their products at prices keyed to local market
conditions. The danger of potential arbitrageurs purchasing
their products at these lower prices and reselling them in
Europe and North America, however, discourages such a
course. This danger is reinforced by The General Agreement on

48.
49.
50.

See supra text accompanying notes 10-11.
See TRIPS Agreement, supra note 46, at 321.
See notes 54 and 55 supra and accompanying text.
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Tariffs and Trade (GATT) Article XI,51 incorporated into the
World Trade Organization Agreement.
GATT Article IX
appears to prevent governments from interfering with
52
arbitrage operations.
The provisions of GATT Article XI, however, should be
53
read in conjunction with Article 31 of the TRIPS Agreement
that permits governments to subject patentees to a compulsorylicensing regime in cases of national emergency or other
circumstances of extreme urgency. The Doha Declaration of
200154 and the subsequent WTO General Council decision of
200355 contemplate an extension of the literal terms of Article
31 to authorize a government to impose compulsory licensing,
allowing foreign producers to supply needed pharmaceuticals.
But the Council decision took steps to ensure that the imported
pharmaceuticals
would not be subject to export by
56
arbitrageurs.
This approach towards a broad interpretation
of Article 31 may well have implications for the interpretation
of GATT Article XI in situations of health emergencies.
Article 31 and its construction in the Doha Declaration and
Council decision provide some relief for underdeveloped nations
experiencing health emergencies.
The effects of the Doha
Declaration and Council decision on the interpretation of GATT
Article XI and the consequent ability of pharmaceutical
companies to offer discount pricing in nations whose
governments commit to preventing arbitrage is as yet unclear.
Nevertheless, the foregoing matters are broadly suggestive of
substantial deficiencies in the way law and pharmaceutical
technologies interact in the development and deployment of
new products.
The intellectual property regime of the
developed world appears to generate products needed in that

51. See GENERAL AGREEMENT ON TARIFFS AND TRADE, Annex 1B, April
15, 1994, 1867 U.N.T.S. 187, 33 I.L.M. 1153 (1994) [hereinafter GATT],
available at http://www.wto.org/english/docs-e/legal-e/06-gatt.pdf.
52. See Daniel J. Gifford, How Do the Social Benefits and Costs of the
Patent System Stack up in Pharmaceuticals?,12 J. INTELL. PROP. L. 75, 115-22
(2004).
53. TRIPS Agreement, supra note 46, at art. 31.
54. See World Trade Organization, Ministerial Declaration of 20
November 2001, WT/MIN(01)/DEC/2, 41 I.L.M 755 (2002).
55. See World Trade Organization, General Council, Implementation of
Paragraph6 of the DOHA Declaration on the TRIPS Agreement and Public
Health, WT/L/540 (Sept. 2, 2003), 43 I.L.M. 509 (2003).
56. Id. at 2(b).
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world.
But-apart from the limited exemptions available
under TRIPS Article 31 and the Doha-generated glosses on its
provisions-that regime denies the use of newly-developed
pharmaceuticals to the underdeveloped world. In addition, the
present system skews research solely toward the needs of the
developed world. The western intellectual-property regime
provides no incentives for the development of cures for sleeping
sickness or other illnesses not found in western nations. Nor
does that regime provide incentives for the development of
vaccines against tuberculosis, a scourge of underdeveloped
nations.
VIII. CONCLUSION
This very brief review of some of the interplay between law
and technology is sufficient to raise serious policy questions
about how that interplay can be improved. The current regime
has conferred immense benefits on mankind.
Yet as the
discussion has shown, it is in no way optimal. Vast room for
improvement exists, not only in industries such as the
pharmaceuticals where the dysfunctions may be more
apparent, but in other areas as well, where markets fail to
57
reflect human needs.

57. Markets thus fail to operate as a stimulus to economic development in
substantial portions of the world where the legal and other preconditions for
their effective operation are lacking. Without outside intervention, vast
numbers of people will be condemned to dire poverty. In such circumstances,
masses of people lack access to even the most elementary technologies. See
JEFFREY D. SACHS, THE END OF POVERTY: ECONOMIC POSSIBILITIES FOR OUR

TIME (2005). These circumstances call for a reevaluation of the interplays
among law, markets and technologies, which is a reevaluation beyond the
scope of this brief paper.

